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An action was brought on behalf of minor illegitimate children
for the wrongful death of their mother. The trial court dismissed the
suit. On appeal the dismissal was affirmed on the grounds that the
denial of the cause of action bore substantial relation to the general
health, morals and welfare of people and discouraged bringing
children into the world out of wedlock; and, that the dismissal was
not a denial of equal protection of the laws, in that there was no
discrimination based on race, color or creed. The Supreme Court
of Louisiana denied certiorari and the case was appealed to the
United States Supreme Court. Held, reversed. The denial to
illegitimate children of the right to recover for the wrongful death of
their mother on whom they were dependent constitutes invidious dis-
crimination against them in violation of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Levy v. Louisiana, 88 S. Ct. 1509
(1968). In the companion case, Glona v. American Guarantee
and Liability Insurance Co., 88 S. Ct. 1515 (1968), the Supreme
Court applied its holding in Levy by reversing lower court decisions
denying a mother a cause of action for the wrongful death of her
minor illegitimate son.
The Louisiana wrongful death statute' specifies the surviving
spouse and child or children of the deceased as the primary class
of beneficiaries. The surviving father and mother, or either of them,
comprise the secondary class of beneficiaries. The courts of Louisi-
ana have construed "child" or "children" as used in the wrongful
death statute to mean legitimate children. This interpretation is in
accord with that of most jurisdictions. The general rule was well
stated in a recent Pennsylvania case:
When the words 'child' or 'children' appear in a statute, in the
absence of qualifying expression, such words are to be inter-
preted ... as referring to a child or children begotten in lawful
wedlock... or begotten out of wedlock but legitimatized ....
I LA. Civ. CoDE ANN. art. 2315 (1952).
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should be re-examined. While the West Virginia court in the Perdue
case requires the movant to disclose some basis for his proposed
amendment, the federal courts grant such leave freely and only deny
a motion to amend when certain conditions exist which would
make it unfair to allow the amendment."0
Joseph Robert Goodwin
Property-Implied Warranty of Fitness in the Sale
of a New House
Morton, who was in the business of building and selling new
houses, contracted to sell a completed house and lot to Humber.
The only warranty contained in the deed was the warranty of title.
No other warranties, written or oral, were connected with the sale.
Humber alleges that the house was not suitable for human habitation
because the fireplace and chimney were not properly constructed.
As a result of this defect, the house caught fire and partially burned
the first time a fire was lighted in the fireplace. Morton defended
on the ground that the doctrine of caveat emptor applied to all sales
of real estate. In the Court of Civil Appeals, Morton's motion for a
summary judgment was granted and Humber appealed. Held,
reversed and remanded. The caveat emptor rule as applied to new
houses is outdated and out of harmony with modern home buying
practices. Consequently, the builder-vendor (house-merchant) im-
pliedly warrants that such house was constructed in a good work-
manlike manner and was suitable for human habitation. Humber
v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
The doctrine of caveat emptor flourished during the nineteenth
century in an atmosphere of rugged individualism where emphasis
was placed on secure business transactions.' However, caveat emptor
was not used extensively in the sale of homes because the home-
buyer often hired an architect for designing and planning and then
hired a contractor to build according to the plans.' If the home were
defective, the home-owner had a cause of action against either the
architect or the contractor.
2OFor a full discussion of judicial discretion in the federal courts see
Donnici, The Amendment of Pleading-A Study of the Operation of Judicial
Discretion in the Federal Courts, 37 S. CAL. L. REV. 529 (1964).
1 Keeton, Rights of Disappointed Purchasers, 32 TEx. L. Rnv. 1 (1953-4).
2 Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant
Did It, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 835, 837 (1967).
- Id. at 837.
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As a result of the boom in house-construction since World War
II, homes have been precut and constructed using the principles
acquired with the advent of mass production. The doctrine which
served as a shield for the skilled artisan of the past has become a
sword for the house-merchant of the present.' If the purchaser today
wants to protect himself against poor construction, it is assumed that
he will insist upon covenants in the deed; if he does not, the doctrine
of caveat emptor applies and the purchaser is without remedy.'
Assults upon the doctrine of caveat emptor have caused it to lose
some if its significant effect. For example, in Miller v. Cannon Hill
Estates, Ltd.,' the court said that when one buys a house that is
in the process of construction there is an implied warranty that
the dwelling will be fit for human habitation. A number of cases
which appeared later followed the groundwork laid in the Miller
case.' The fact that the houses were under construction when the
purchase contract was executed has allowed the courts to treat the
contracts as construction contracts.' In building and construction con-
tracts it is implied that the work will be done in a reasonably good
and workmanlike manner and that the completed structure will be
reasonably fit for the intended purpose.9
The next logical step has been for the courts to apply the doctrine
of implied warranty to the purchase of a completed structure. In
Carpenter v. Donohoe,"° the Colorado court held that in the sale of a
new house by a builder-vendor there was an implied warranty of
4 Id.
5 Baker v. Letzkus, 116 W. Va. 647, 649, 182 S.E. 761, 762 (1935) (no
implied warranties in a deed); Johnston's Admr. v. Mendenhall, 9 W. Va. 112,
120 (1876) (caveat empter applies in the sale of realty).
6 2 K.B. 113, 120 (1931). The court based its decision on the defend-
ant's oral assurances that the material was of the best quality and the best
workmanship would be applied to them.
7 Glisan v. Smolenske, 153 Colo. 274, 387 P.2d 260 (1963); Weck v.
A.M. Sunrise Construction Co., 36 Ill. App. 2d 383, 184 N.E.2d 728 (1962);
Jones v. Gatewood, 381 P.2d 158 (Okla. 1963); Hoye v. Century Builders,
Inc., 52 Wash. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958).
8 E.g., Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 52 Wash. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474,(1958).9 Mann v. Clowser, 190 Va. 887, 59 S.E.2d 78 (1950). The doctrine of
caveat emptor has been of no avail to builder-vendors when as a result of
defective construction a new owner or invitee is physically injured. Schipper v.
Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N. 3. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); It seems inconsistent to
allow a recent purchaser to recover for physical injury resulting from defective
construction and yet deny that same purchaser the right to compel the build-
er-vendor to repair a defect before an injury occurs. For a more detailed
discussion, see Bearman, Caveat Emptor In Sales Of Realty-Recent As-
saults Upon The Rule, 14 VAND. L. Rav. 541, 570 (1960).1o 15 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964). The court succinctly stated, "[tihat
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workmanlike construction and that the house was suitable for
habitation.
The underlying theory of the doctrine of implied warranty is
reliance. As a particular item becomes more expensive there is an
apparent corresponding increase in the buyer's reliance upon the
seller. When a vendee purchases a new home from a builder-vendor,
he is relying upon the ski-s of that individual as a builder, even
though the agreement involved is a purchasing contract and not a
building contract." The fact that the vendee is relying upon the
skill of his builder-vendor becomes more obvious if one considers
that the vendee normally has no architect of his own, no real com-
petence to perform his own inspection, and has no opportunity for
obtaining protection in the deed since there is a ready market for
new houses. 2
Houses are currently being produced in a manner analogous to
the assembly-line methods used in the production of personal
property. The courts came to the aid of the disgruntled purchaser
of personalty. 3 If courts continue to adhere to the doctrine of
caveat emptor in the sale of new houses by a builder-vendor, then
legislation may be the only answer for the house-buying public."
Ray Allen Byrd
a different rule should apply to the purchaser of a house which is near com-
pletion than would apply to one who purchases a new house seems incongruous.
To say that the former may rely on an implied warranty and the latter can-
not is recognizing a distinction without a reasonable basis for it." Id. at 83,
388 P.2d at 402.
11 Bearman, supra note 9, at 574.
1 2 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).The extension of the doctrine of implied warranty for the sale of a new house
is not without criticism from the house-merchant. The arguments most used
by builder-vendors for support include: (1) the bargaining positions of the
parties are equal; (2) the agreements between the parties merge in the deed;(3) real estate transactions would become chaotic and uncertain. For general
discussions concerning the efficacy of the builder-vendor's contentions see 26
C.J.S. Deeds § 91 (1956); 7 S. WmILisToN, Contracts § 926A (3d ed. 1963);
Bearman, supra note 9; Roberts, supra note 2 at 857; Note, Implied Warranty
of Fitness for Habitation in Sale of Residential Dwellings, 43 DENVER LJ.
379 (1966).
13 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
14 In 1967, the New York Law Revision Commission recommended to the
legislature that the housing merchant should warrant the house is free from
construction defects and is fit for habitation; and that disclaimers and the doc-
trine of merger will no longer eliminate the builder-vendor's responsibility in
this regard. Roberts, supra note 2, at 866-67. The National Association of
Home Builders recommended to its members that they supply a written war-
ranty guaranteeing to correct any defects for which the builders could be
deemed responsible. 6 N.A.H.B. CoPnnLAToR 2 (1952).
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